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POLITICS AND TRADE POLICY:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Abstract
In this paper we examine the empirical relevance of three prominent
endogenous protection models.  Is protection for sale, or do altruistic policy
makers worry about political support?  We find strong evidence that protection
is indeed "for sale."  The important new result is, however, that not only the
existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and
anti protection contributions.  All variables of both the  Influence Driven
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz,
1982) models are significant at the one percent level. Novel is our application of
a single, unified theoretical framework to take strict interpretations of the three
theoretical models to the data. We thus extend the previous tests of the
Influence Driven approach by comparing its performance to well specified
alternatives. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we find
significant misspecification in the Political Support Function approach. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct specification of the Influence Driven
model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.
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The trade literature offers a variety of competing explanations for the prevailing
trade policies.  In contrast to the traditional models that analyze trade policy in terms of
economic efficiency, the lion's share of the recent literature is based on distributional
considerations.  In these endogenous protection models, self-interested politicians use
trade policy to transfer income to particular interest groups.  Given that contributions
from lobbies and Political Action Committees figure prominently in the political
landscape where tariffs, quotas, and voluntary export restraints exist in spite of their large
social costs, this recent literature seems to provide particularly intuitive explanations for
the observed pattern of protection.
Since the early 1980's, several alternative political economy approaches to
endogenous protection have been advanced.  There does not exist, however, a
comparative study that takes the exact theoretical models to the data in order to examine
their comparative empirical relevance.  Previous empirical studies of the political
economy determinants of trade protection are numerous, but rely on reduced forms (see
Rodrik, 1995, for an excellent survey).  However, the reduced form approach introduces
ambiguity as to which model is actually tested, and the choice of independent variables is
the subject of profound concern (see Rodrik, 1995).
1  Even more importantly, the distinct
differences in the theoretical structures of the models have to date not permitted a
comprehensive assessment as to exactly which approach to endogenous protection is
more empirically relevant.
2
The  lack of comparative empirical tests can be attributed to the absence of a
unified theory.  In a recent paper, however, Helpman (1997) developed a comprehensive
framework that we utilize to derive empirical models of endogenous protection that
render the theoretical approaches easily comparable.  Specifically, we test the tariff
                                                                
1 For the most extensive comparison of endogenous tariff formation models within this traditional
framework see Gawande (1998).  Aside from significance, his measure of validity is "that at least some
subset of variables representing [any one] theory is shown to have the correct sign."
2 For example, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) develop excellent
tests of the "Influence Driven Contributions" approach popularized by Grossman and Helpman (1994).
The pattern of protection in the data seems to be consistent with the model's predictions.  No matter how
significant the results of one model may be, there still remains interest in ascertaining its predictive power
relative to alternative models of endogenous protection.4
formulas that are predicted by the political equilibria of the Influence Driven (Grossman
and Helpman, 1994), Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982), and the Political
Support Function (Hillman, 1982) approaches.  This allows us to extend the tests of the
Influence Driven model by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) (G-M from  hereout) and
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (G-B from hereout) and compare the performance
of all three approaches.  This juxtaposition is especially relevant, since the Influence
Driven model contains essential elements of both Tariff Function and Political Support
Function.
3
Helpman’s (1997) theoretical framework holds clear implications for empirical
testing: the sectoral import elasticities and the levels of import penetration are crucial
variables for all models.  Depending on the nature of the specific approach, these
variables are augmented with additional explanatory variables suggested by the theory.
This allows us to estimate key parameters, and to test the models' respective significance
for endogenous protection.  In the Political Support Model we introduce measures of
sectoral profits and welfare to estimate the marginal rate of substitution between the two
in the government’s political support function.  In the Tariff Function model we employ
contributions to estimate the pro or anti tariff contributions' weights in the tariff function.
In the Influence Driven model we utilize a measure of organization to test whether
contributions or the existence of a lobby matter and to estimate the model’s key
parameters.
Our estimation takes into account the possible endogeneity of independent
variables.  Using a Tobit, instrumental variable approach and a GMM minimum distance
estimator (MDE), the empirical results yield little ambiguity.  The Political Support
model does not perform well throughout; this may be due to imperfect data proxies
(especially profit measures), or it may be a function of the model’s inability to account
for direct lobbying actions.  The one interesting aspect about the estimation of the
Political Support model is that the weight that the government places on welfare, relative
                                                                
3 The Tariff Function model focuses on contributions, much like the Influence Driven model, although the
latter emphasizes the importance of organized lobbies.  The Political Support model maximizes the
government’s support from consumers and firms.  This is similar to the Influence Driven model, in which
case governments care about consumers and firms, but also worry about their own welfare.5
to profits, is large (but not statistically significant) and of similar magnitude as the one we
estimate for the Influence Driven approach.
In clear contrast, the Tariff Function approach performs strongly.  All coefficients
are of the correct sign, and significant at the 1 percent level.  Sectoral contributions are
shown to have a strong positive impact on tariffs. In the absence of lobbying
contributions, the relationship between import penetration and endogenous protection is
positive, although the estimate is three orders of magnitude smaller than the estimate on
contributions.  The weight of supporters' contributions in the tariff formation function is
estimated to be twice as large as the one associated with contributions of tariff opponents.
The Influence Driven model is also strongly confirmed, with all coefficients
exhibiting the correct sign and strong statistical significance.  In contrast to G-M, all three
predictions of the model can be confirmed at the 1 percent level: a) protection is shown to
be higher in industries represented by lobbies and with lower import elasticity, b) tariffs
increase with import penetration in unorganized sectors, c) tariffs decrease with import
penetration in organized sectors.  In estimating the model’s key parameters, we find,
much like G-M, that the government’s weight on aggregate welfare is about 10 times of
what it attaches to contributions.  This result contrasts with G-B, who find that the
government has about equal weights on contributions and national welfare.
While our estimated government weight on aggregate welfare is very similar to
G-M, our estimates indicate that about 26 percent of the population owns sector specific
inputs, a more realistic number than the 88 percent estimated by G-M.  Overall, we
interpret our results of the Influence Driven model as a broad confirmation of previous
tests of the Influence Driven model (G-M and G-B).  The consistency of the results
across the three papers is impressive, especially given the different methodologies, data
sets, and specifications.
Since the Influence Driven model and the Tariff Function model both perform
well when taken to the data, the question arises: does a combination of the two improve
the estimation of endogenous protection, or doe s if one of the variables hold relatively
more explanatory power?  We find that the key variable of the Influence Driven model
(an indicator variable that identifies the existence of an organized lobby) seems to be
more significant than the pure volume of sectoral lobby expenditures.6
To formally juxtapose all three models we employ J-Tests.  We cannot reject the
null hypothesis of correct specification of the Influence Driven model, but find evidence
of some misspecification in the Tariff Function, and of significant misspecification in the
Political Support Function approach.  The results provide additional evidence as to the
strength and robustness of the Influence Driven model and to the significance of the
Tariff Function model in explaining endogenous protection.  Our tests of the strict
theories add to the voluminous empirical literature on protection that focussed on
heuristic or general factor endowment approaches, such as Ray (1981), Baldwin (1985),
or Trefler (1993).  Especially interesting is the comparison of our results to the findings
of previous reduced form juxtapositions of endogenous tariff formation models in
Gawande (1998).  He finds, similar to our results, that the political-self-interest/special-
interest model performs best against alternative models, while the public-
interest/political-altruism type model associated with Hillman (1982) evidence is at best
weak.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The theoretical framework of
endogenous protection is reviewed in section 2.  We discuss the empirical methodology
used to estimate the three models in Section 3.  Data issues and empirical results are
discussed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.  All tables are
relegated to the appendix.
2 Theoretical Approaches to Endogenous Protection
We commence by outlining the common theoretical framework that serves as the
basis for our empirical analysis.  The analysis is a succinct representation of Helpman
(1997), who discusses both the motivations and derivations in detail.  The critical
advantage of Helpman's (1997) model is that the derived equations for endogenous
protection are sufficiently similar to allow for comparative testing of the various
approaches.  In addition, the model nicely highlights the common fundamental structure
that the models share.
Consider a continuum of individuals, j, populate an economy whose population
size is normalized to unity.  Each individual possesses a utility function7
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where  i c is consumption of product  i.  A numeraire good, indexed 0, is produced using
only one unit of labor per unit output.  All other products are produced with labor and a
sector-specific input.
An individual owns 
j l  of  the aggregate labor supply, and 
j
i g  of the sectors'
specific input.  The wage rate then equals one, and the return to a sector specific input,
) ( i i p P , is an increasing function of the producer price,  i p .  Let aggregate imports be
denoted by  i M , and normalize all foreign prices to unity, which implies  i i p t = , and
1 > i t  for positive rates of protection.  Finally, suppose that the government redistributes
tariff revenue lump-sum, and uniformly to all individuals.  The reduced form of the
indirect utility function can then be written as an additive composite of the incomes
derived from labor, transfer and the specific factor incomes, plus the consumer surplus,
Si:
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By integrating over all individuals (2), the aggregate welfare is given by
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From these general definitions of the indirect utility and welfare we can derive three
distinct models of endogenous protection based on different specifications of the political
economy process.
2.1 The Political Support Function Approach
The Political Support Function approach was developed by Hillman (1982) and
generalized by Van Long and Vousden (1991).  In this approach the government trades
off political support from consumers against higher industry profits.  The support for the
government from the industry increases in industry’s profits, while consumers raise their
support when product prices decline.  The exact mechanics by which either group
provides support are not specified.  Much like in Staiger and Tabellini (1987), the
government does not have a self-interested motive, other than to redistribute in order to8
minimize the loss to either constituency.  It is thus possible to interpret the model as one
in which an altruistic government chooses a tariff to maximize aggregate support from its
constituents.
Following Hillman (1982), the government’s generic political support function
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] t t t W , P Q = Q ,
contains domestic welfare and industry profits, both as functions of the tariff.  Higher
support from the industry and from the general population is forthcoming if profits and
welfare increase,  0 , > Q QP W .  However, profits increase with tariffs, while welfare
decreases.  The government maximizes the political support by choosing a tariff that




























Helpman (1997) defines  P d  as  the marginal rate of substitution between
aggregate welfare and profits of special interests in the government’s political support
function. The greater  , p d  the more likely is the government to give up industry profits to
increase aggregate welfare.  Extending Hillman (1982) to many sectors,  i, and using a
specific functional form, Helpman (1997) rewrites the political support function as
[ ] [ ] [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) 1 ,..., 1 , 1 1
1 ˆ
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Using (4) and (5), the government chooses the optimal tariff to maximize its political
support, which implies the tariff rate
4
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where  ( )( ) 0 , > P P - ” P W d dW i i W i s  is the support function’s elasticity of substitution
between profits and aggregate welfare in sector  i.  From the definition of  , p d  we know
that 
i W P , s  also equals the ratio of the profit and welfare elasticities in the political9
support function  ( ) ( ) Q ¶ Q ¶ Q P P ¶ Q ¶ W W i i * * .  Hence 
i W P , s  can be loosely
interpreted as the weight the government places on profits, relative to aggregate welfare.
The tariff increases in the sector's output level, Xi, because the larger the domestic
output, the greater the benefits to domestic producers when the domestic price increases.
The tariff decreases in the elasticity of the import demand function, since the welfare loss
increases and the government is less willing to impose excess burden on society.  In
addition, the more likely the government is to trade off sectoral profits for national
welfare, the lower the tariff in that sector.
While the theory does not provide insights into the determinants of the elasticity
of substitution between aggregate welfare and special interest profits, we can utilize the
data to obtain an estimate.  Using proxies for wealth, as well as for industry profits, we
can derive estimates for 
i W P , s .  How relevant this estimate is will depend on the power of
equation (6) to predict endogenous protection.
2.2 The Tariff Function Approach
Rather than the passive form of support assumed in the Political Support Function
approach, our next approach assumes that agents actively participate in the process of
tariff determination.  Findlay and Wellisz (1982) pioneered the approach in which pro
and anti protectionists "invest" in the political process, so that the outcome, a tariff, is the
result of a lobbying contest.  How responsive the tariff is to the respective groups’
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i C represent the respective expenditures of protection
supporters and opponents.
Helpman (1997) captured the idea of active intervention by supposing that the
owners of the specific factor in sector  i, who constitute a fraction  i a  of the population,
form an interest group.  This group lobbies for protection to maximize the joint welfare,
) ( i
s
i W t , of the participants of the lobby, which can be represented by
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4 The derivation uses the properties of the utility that  [ ] ' ' P + - = S M  and that  ' P = X .10
Similar to (2), the joint welfare can be written as an additive composite of labor and
specific factor income, the lobby’s share of the tariff rebate, and the consumer surplus.
The marginal benefit to protection of the supporters of protection then equals
, ) 1 ( ) 1 ( i i i i i
s
i M X W ¢ - + - =
¢ t a a  which is positive for sufficiently small values of  i t .
The antagonists of the owners of the specific factor in sector  i also form a lobby
to oppose protection.  To simplify the analysis, Helpman (1997) assumes that this group
consists of all other individuals in the economy.  This group’s joint welfare is
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which implies that  i a - 1  of the tariff rebate and consumer surplus is recaptured.  The
marginal benefit of the opponents of protection,  ], ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( i i i i
o
i M X W ¢ - + - - =
¢ t a  is
negative for positive tariff rates.
An interior equilibrium of the non-cooperative game among interest g roups
requires that the marginal benefit to joint welfare equals the partial derivatives of the
tariff function with respect to the spending level of each lobby (the marginal cost).  These
additional conditions (one for each group) yield the tariff function
,
) ( ) 1 (
















where  i b  is the marginal rate of substitution between the supporters' and opponents'
spending levels in the tariff function.  The Tariff Function approach thus implies that a
sector is protected if and only if this ratio of elasticities exceeds unity, or  1 > i b .  This
implies that a sector is protected only if a dollar spent by pro-protectionists raises the
tariff by more than it declines due to a dollar spent by anti protectionists.  If both sides'
expenditures are equally potent in influencing the tariff function with an additional dollar,
free trade will result.
In addition, if a sector is protected, the tariff increases in the fraction of people in
the population that belong to the protectionist group.  As in the Political Support Function
approach, the tariff increases in the sector's output level and as the elasticity of the import
demand function falls.  Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982) extend the Findlay and Wellisz
framework to allow for a government that cares not only about the lobbyists' welfare, but11
also about the general public; a theme subsequently developed fully by the Influence
Driven approach.
2.3 The Influence-Driven Contributions Approach
The Political Contributions approach, developed by Grossman and Helpman
(1994), is in many ways the natural extension of the Tariff Function and the Political
Support approach.  This approach illuminates the "black box" that generates the tariff in
Section 2.2 and allows for a natural way to introduce the excess burden, so that not all
individuals are involved in either pro and anti lobbying in all sectors.  In addition, the
politicians care about their own interest (contributions) as well as consumer/firm welfare.
In the Political Contribution approach, interest groups that maximize benefits to
their members offer politicians campaign contributions to influence their policy stance.
Accordingly, politicians seek to maximize a political objective function that depends on
contributions and on the well being of the general public.  Knowing how contributions
from constituents depend on the selected policies, politicians choose their policy stance.
Suppose the political objective function that the policy maker maximizes is
( ) , 1 W C b b + -  where  ￿ =
i i C C  stands for the sum of campaign contributions from all
sectors, W  represents aggregate welfare, and  b is a parameter that represents the weight
the government places on welfare considerations.  If a sector does not contribute to the
campaign, the policy maker disregards that sector's special interest concerns.
Suppose that in some subset of the sectors,  L } ,..., 2 , 1 { n ￿ , the owners of the
sector-specific inputs form lobbies.  The aggregate welfare of the interest group is then
given by
)] ( ) ( ) 1 [( ) ( ) (
1
j j j j j
n
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, (8)
which again includes labor and specific factor incomes as well as the tariff rebates and
consumer surplus.  The lobby maximizes  i i C W - ) (t  and takes the contribution functions
of all the other interest groups  i j „ ,  ) (t j C , as given.  If lobby  i wants to generate a tariff,
it must offer a contribution.  The size of the contribution is determined by the condition
that the lobby must contribute sufficiently to raise the policy maker's welfare above12
( ) )] ( ) ( 1 [ max t b t b t W C G j i j i + S - = „ - , which is the level generated in the absence of
lobby  i's contribution.  In short, the standard participation constraint in principal-agent
problems requires that in equilibrium contributions equal
( ) )] ( ) ( 1 [ ) ( t b t b t W C G C j
i j
i i + S - - =
„
- . (9)
This implies that interest groups lobby not only for their own cause, but for an entire
tariff policy vector, that maximizes each lobby’s objective function  i i C W - ) (t
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where  ￿ ˛ =
L j j L a a stands for the fraction of people that own sector specific inputs and Ij
is a dummy that takes the value of one if  L i˛ , that is, if the sector is organized, and zero
otherwise.
In the extreme case, when all sectors have organized pressure groups and every
individual has a stake in some sector, there is free trade.  From (10) we find that the rate
of protection in sector  i increases in the concentration of the ownership in that sector's
specific factor, since the greater the concentration, the less the lobby cares about dead
weight loss.  The tariff also increases in the weight the policy maker places on
contributions relative to welfare, since it becomes "cheaper" to influence the policy
maker with contributions.  The effects of output and of the slope of the import demand
function are the same as in the formulas that derived for both the Political Support
Function approach, and the Tariff Function approach.  However there is an added twist to
the model.  For protected sectors, I = 1, the tariff rate should decrease in the import
penetration ratio.  This is because the larger the domestic output, the more owners of
specific factors gain from an increase in the domestic price, while the economy as a
whole incurs fewer inefficiency losses when the volume of imports is low,  ceteris13
paribus.  For unprotected sectors, the relationship between tariffs and import penetration
is positive.
In comparing the Influence Driven approach with the previous ones, we observe
several similarities.  The effect of the degree of concentration of ownership is similar to
the Tariff Function approach, while the role of the marginal rate of substitution between
welfare and contributions plays a similar role to the marginal rate of substitution between
welfare and profits in the Political Support Function approach.
3 Empirical Methodology
To allow for the estimation of the three competing approaches contained in
equations (6), (7), and (10), we must introduce several simplifying assumptions.  First,
for each model we follow the procedure of G-M and move the import elasticities to the
left-hand side, to counter measurement errors.
5  Measurement errors in the dependent
variable cause a loss of efficiency, while measurement errors in the exogenous variables
cause biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates.  Second, we assume that the
elasticities in equations (6) and (7) are constant across sectors.  We use the Wald Test to
check the validity of this assumption, and it can already be said that parameter instability
will be rejected in either model.
6
Our third assumption concerns the Tariff Function model (7), where we assume a
specific functional form for the tariff function to conveniently take the model to the data.
In essence this approach is the same as in the political support model, where Helpman
(1997) assumed a specific functional form of the political support function (5).  As in
Helpman's political support function, we introduce the factors additively.  Furthermore
we assume increasing returns to lobbying (to reflect the real world observation that large
donors command relatively greater influence).  The simplest form is then
( ) ( )( )
2 2
1 [.]
O S C C T l l - - = , where  l and 1 -  l respectively indicate the weight of the
                                                                
5 G-B have improved the estimation procedure by utilizing the standard errors on the elasticities.  We
maintain the G-M methodology for comparison purposes.
6 Alternatively, we could consider the elasticities random coefficients in which case we would estimate its
mean instead of its true value.  However, estimating a random coefficient model implies that the errors are
heteroscedastic. While ignoring heteroscedasticity in a standard least square regression model leads to
inefficient but consistent estimates, heteroscedasticity of the errors in a Tobit model is likely to cause the
maximum likelihood estimator to be inconsistent (see Greene (1997), chapter 20).14
different contributions in the Tariff Function.  In addition we assume that the
concentration of ownership is small relative to the rest of the population.  This implies
that  ( ) i i a a - 1  is negligible and approaches zero.  The approximation error introduced
by this assumption is small if the number of industries is large and if ownership of the
specific factor is fairly evenly distributed among the population.
Therefore, the three empirical models that will be tested are given by
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z =  is  the import
penetration ratio. Since we employ stochastic versions of (6), (7), and (10) in the
econometric analysis, a disturbance term,  ji e , was added. A Tobit estimation is necessary
for (6a), (7a) and (10a) due to the censoring of the dependent variable at zero.
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to question the exogeneity of the
independent variables in (6a), (7a), and (10a) (see Trefler, 1993, and G-M, for a
discussion).  To correct for the possible bias in the estimates caused by the endogeneity
of the explanatory variables, we use the same set of exogenous (instrumental) variables as
in G-M which allows us to directly compare our results to the results reported in G-M.
In contrast to the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) used in G-M, we apply a
minimum distance estimator (MDE). The MDE approach is useful in estimating
simultaneous equations (see Lee, 1996, chapter 5 and 9) and can be easily extended to
models with censored and/or binary dependent variables. The main problem the MDE
answers is how to optimally impose the overidentifying restrictions. The MDE is a two-
step estimator. In the first step, the relationship between each of the K endogenous
variables and the set of exogenous variables is estimated. In the second step, the
parameter vector of interest, a, is consistently estimated with feasible GLS using only the15
first-step coefficient estimates. The reason why we can apply GLS to a data set with only
K “observations” is that the error term in the second step estimation has a degenerate
distribution converging to 0. Finally, in the case that the reduced form estimator is MLE
and the overidentying restrictions are linear, MLE applied directly to the estimation of a




We follow G-M in the construction of the key data, Political Action Committee
contributions, non-tariff barriers, import penetration ratios and import elasticities.  We
thus use U.S. data for 106 manufacturing industries at the three-digit SIC level for 1983.
Estimates of import demand elasticities are not available at the four-digit SIC level, hence
we base this study on three-digit level data.  The data on non-tariff barriers (NTBs),  i t ,
import penetration ratio, z, and the instrumental variables used in the Tobit IV estimates
are taken from Trefler (1993), but aggregated to the three-digit level using as weights the
share in value of shipment. TOTALSALESi denotes the value of shipments per industry,
obtained from the 1996 NBER productivity database, and TOTALSALES is the value of
shipment aggregated over all industries and scaled by 10,000. Import demand elasticities,
i e , are taken from Sheills, Stern, and Deardorff (1986).
9  Political Action Committee
contributions by firms and unions in each sector were obtained from Gawande (for details
on how these data were constructed, see the appendix in G-B). The data, covering
contributions over four Congressional election cycles 1977-78, 1979-80, 1981-82, and
1983-84, measure spending per firm and union divided by value added.  Multiplying by
value added as well as by the number of contributing firms and unions, we obtain total
contributions by firms and unions per industry.  TOTALCONTRIBUTIONSi represents
the sum of firm and union contributions in a sector, while TOTALCONTRIBUTIONS is
measured as the sum of all sector-specific contributions by firms and unions. For the
organization dummy, ORGANIZED, in the Influence Driven approach we use a
contribution threshold level similar to the one used in G-M.
                                                                
7 For further details, see Lee, 1996, pp92-94.
8 See the appendix for an overview.
9 There is a small number of industries with positive import demand elasticities in our sample. Following
G-M, we set these elasticities to zero.16
Our data set deviates from G-M since we have to construct additional variables to
test the alternative endogenous protection approaches.  We construct two different profit
measures.  The first profit variable, PROFITS1, is based on the latest version of the 1996
NBER productivity database, from which we derive profits per industry as value-added
minus total labor cost.  The second profit measure, PROFITS2, was obtained from pre-
tax income for 1983 as derived from the IRS source book, after converting the IRS data
from SOI classification to three-digit SIC level. Both measures are imperfect.  PROFITS2
is a direct profit measure, while PROFITS1 is an indirect measure that includes the
regular return to capital as well as true industry profits. While PROFITS1 is a precise
three-digit SIC industry measure, PROFITS2 contains the usual conversion error. The
correlation between profit measures is 0.4, which confirms substantial differences
between the two proxies.  However, if we were to remove one outlier (industry 291;
Petroleum Refining), the correlation coefficient would increase to 0.7.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Political Support Function
The first round of estimates of the theoretical models is provided in Table 1.  In
the Political Support Function model, we estimate the elasticity of substitution between
profits and aggregate welfare in the political support function.  We attempted several
specifications of welfare for the political support function.  None worked as well as
TOTALSALES and still the results are not satisfactory.
10  Test results using either profit
measure (PROFITS1i or PROFITS2i) disappoint, the coefficient estimates are statistically
insignificant.  In addition, only the direct profit measure, PROFITS2i exhibits the
expected positive sign.
Despite the insignificant estimates, we venture to remark that the elasticity of
substitution between aggregate welfare and profits is extremely low in either regression,
indicating that the policy makers' political support function places significantly larger
weight on aggregate welfare than on profits.  Using a Cobb Douglas Support Function
with constant returns akin to the functional form used in Grossman and Helpman,  the
                                                                
10 Any welfare measure is only going to affect the scale but not the qualitative results.17
value of 0.028 implies an elasticity of the support function with respect to welfare of
about 0.97.  This value of the implied weight on welfare is strikingly similar to the one
we derive in the Influence Driven model below.
The fact that these regressions also exhibit the lowest log-likelihood ratio values
may serve as additional evidence that the model is either misspecified or missing key
elements.  We will discuss this issue further when we compare the models in section 6.
Alternatively one could argue that governments do not in fact maximize their political
support (because of bounded rationality, or imperfect information).
5.2 Tariff Function
Translating contributions of the "supporters" and "opponents" of tariffs in each
sector from the theory into the real world requires some interpretation.  In the spirit of
Findlay and Wellisz, supporters of protection in sectori would be that sector's owners of
factors and workers, at least in the short run.  Lobbying against would be the factor
owners and workers in all other sectors.  Hence we aggregate union and firm
contributions in each sector and divide by the contributions of all unions and firms.
11
The model carries 3 predictions.  First, since Helpman (1997) augmented the
Findlay and Wellisz model to explicitly include consumer surplus, the effect of import
penetration on tariffs is negative in the absence of contributions.  Second, the model
predicts that the greater the contributions of supporters relative to opponents of
protection, the larger the negative impact of import penetration on tariffs.
The Tariff Function model performs surprisingly well.  Both parameter estimates
are significant at the one percent level and exhibit the right sign.  An increase one sector's
contributions relative to all other sectors has a surprisingly large effect on the dependent
variable.  The fit is better than for either Political Support model we tested.  The implied
weight of the contributions of supporters of tariffs,  l, is estimated to be .66, implying
that the tariff function weighs contributions from pro lobbies twice as much as those from
tariff opponents.
                                                                
11 Alternative specifications pitting firms against unions in each sector did not generate plausible results.
Baldwin and Magee (1998) find that votes in Congress against (for) freer trade are associated with
aggregate contributions of Labor (business).18
It may not be all that surprising that the Tariff Function model performs so well.
From previous work (G-M and G-B) we know that the strict version of the Influence
Driven model performs adequately in empirical tests.  The Tariff Function approach
shares some close similarities with the Influence Driven approach.  In essence equation
(7a) tests two hypotheses.  One is that if the marginal rate of substitution of the tariff
formation function is zero (or if supporters’ contributions are zero), then the effect of the
import penetration on tariffs is positive.  This is similar to the Influence Driven model, in
which protection increases in import penetration if a lobby is not organized.  If, on the
other hand, the tariff function contains some element of weight for the pro tariff
supporters, and if there are positive contributions from a pro tariff lobby, then the impact
of import penetration is negative.  This is similar to the Influence Driven model in which
protection is higher in industries with lower import penetration when sectors are
organized.
5.3 Influence Driven
The estimates of the Influence Driven model are in line with the estimates
reported in G-M.  Small differences remain due to both minor differences in the data set
and different estimation procedures.
12  If anything, this should be seen as a strong
confirmation of the results obtained by G-M.
13
As the theory predicts, the estimates show that in addition to the positive effect of
import penetration on the dependent variable, there is a negative effect of import
penetration on non-tariff barriers for organized industries (i.e. for industries with firm
contributions above a certain, exogenously determined threshold).  Thus we confirm the
Grossman and Helpman (1994) proposition at the 1 percent significance level, that
whether or not a sector is organized plays a crucial role in explaining the relationship
between import penetration and protection.
                                                                
12 We did not receive the G-M dataset.  In reconstructing the 3 digit SIC level data set from 4 digit level
data, we end up with 106 SIC industries compared to 107 in G-M. This difference may be due to the fact
that we use a data set that includes additional variables not included in the G-M data set and/or a more
recent version of the NBER Manufacturing Productivity database. Besides sample size, the slight
differences in the coefficient estimates may be the result of differences in the estimation procedure (MDE
here instead of MLE in G-M).
13 G-M conduct extensive sensitivity analysis.  Their results are robust and the same pertains to the results
above.19
Based on the coefficient estimates, the implied value for the government weight
on welfare, b, is 0.96 (0.986), while the fraction of the population that owns sector
specific inputs,  L a , is 0.26 (0.88).  The numbers in the brackets indicate the results of G-
M.  The estimates of the government weight on welfare are equally high, while G-M
estimate a significantly higher level of ownership of the sector specific input.  The
estimates in our model and in G-M are significant at the 1 percent level, hence the strong
difference in the estimates for the degree of concentration within a sector is likely due to
the differences in the estimation method.
While our results in this section are similar to G-M, they contrast to those of G-B,
who find that the respective government weighs on aggregate welfare and contributions
are about the same.  In case studies, governments are generally found to be significantly
more concerned about welfare (see Hufbauer et. al. 1986, and Stern 1988, as cited by G-
B).
All sign predictions were correct in G-M, however, their estimation method did
not yield a significant positive sign for the key third prediction, that  4 5 a a +  > 0 in
equation (7a), implying a negative relationship between import penetration and protection
within the set of organized sectors.  Using a slightly improved estimation technique that
otherwise generates just about identical results to G-M, we find that  4 5 a a + > 0 is
significant at the 1 percent significance level.  Using a simple two-sided test for a null
hypothesis of  4 5 a a +  = 0, the estimate for  4 5 a a +  is 0.0276, with a t-statistic of 5.905.
We therefore reject the null hypothesis and can state with some confidence that  4 5 a a + >
0.
14  Hence we provide additional strong support for the Grossman Helpman (1994)
approach in that all its predictions are strongly reflected in the data.
The goodness of fit of the Influence Driven model is better than the fit of the other
two models.  This adds empirical evidence to the discussion of the effect of import
penetration on endogenous protection.  Several previous studies have found that NTB
coverage increases with import penetration (i.e., Finger and Harrison 1996, Lee and
Swagel, 1997) or with the change in import penetration (Treffler 1993).  Only the tests of
the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model by G-M and G-B find evidence to the contrary
                                                                
14 More complicated, one-sided tests would only increase the power of this result.20
as they take the exact theory to the data.  Both find a negative influence although not
statistically significant.
15 Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000) provide a succinct model
how positive and negative impacts can be reconciled, by introducing further policy tools
(VER's and quotas) to the government in Grossman and Helpman (1994).  Maggi and
Rodriguez-Claire (2000) also make the important distinction between importers and
producers to flesh out the destination between quotas and tariffs.
5.4 Parameter Stability
To test for structural change of the estimated coefficients, we separate the samples
and perform a Wald test for each approach to endogenous protection.  The Wald statistic,
) ˆ ˆ ( ) ( )' ˆ ˆ ( 2 1
1
2 1 2 1 1 q q q q - + - = L
- V V ,
has a chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom where k=1 in (6a), k=2 in (7a)
and (10a), and k=4 in (11). To estimate  1 L , we replace  1 V and  2 V  by their estimated
values, a procedure that is valid in large samples.  The test statistics and the
corresponding p-values for each model are provided in the last row of Table 1.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of parameter stability at the one percent
significance level for any of the three models.  Since the Wald test for parameter stability
has the property in small and medium-sized samples that the probability of type I error is
larger than the chosen critical value, a larger critical value is appropriate to correct for
this problem.  We therefore conclude that parameter instability is not a problem in the
Political Support, Tariff Function, or Influence Driven models.
6.  Model Comparisons
Both the Tariff Function and the Influence Driven model perform exceedingly
well, while the Political Support model disappoints.  This raises two further questions.
First, does one of the highly significant models hold unambiguously more explanatory
power?  This question goes beyond a comparison of the goodness of fit, it addresses the
issue of correct specification of the exogenous variables. We employ non-nested
hypothesis testing in form of J tests in an attempt to provide an answer in Section 6.2.
                                                                
15Grossman and Helpman (1994) emphasize that the result is dependent on the relative magnitudes of
import penetration and import demand elasticities across sectors.  Only G-M and Gawande and21
The second question to ask leads us away from strict theory and concerns the
explanatory power of each individual exogenous variable in the three models.  It is
natural to inquire if the fit and the explanatory power of the regression can be improved
by combining variables from all approaches in one regression.  This question is not
entirely devoid of theory.  In a sense the generic Political Support model is augmented in
the Influence Driven model by contributions and by the influence of lobbies.  On the
other hand, the Tariff Function model’s contributions are augmented in the Influence
Driven model’s emphasis on organization.  Here it would be interesting to ascertain
which is the better determinant of endogenous protection, contributions or organization.
This question is tackled in Section 6.1, while the J tests are presented in Section 6.2.
6.1 General Models
We can compare the power of the variables suggested by the strict theoretical
models in a "General" model that combines all variables in one regression.
General1(a & b) .
1 1 1 1
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The results from the Tobit MDE estimation of General1a and General1b (using
our two profit measures) is reported in the first column of Table 2. The results show that
little explanatory power is derived from either profit measure, PROFITS1 or PROFITS2.
In General1a the relative contribution variable from the Tariff Function model is
significant (at the 10 percent level), all other variables are statistically insignificant.  The
alternative profit measure in General1b yields a highly significant organization variable
and an excellent fit, but no other significant variables.   Since either contributions or
organization were significant, but never the profit measures, we proceed by excluding
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General2 generates by far the best fit of all regressions, including the strict
theoretical approaches in Table 1.  As expected, in the absence of contributions or
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Bandyopadhyay have previously controlled for sectoral differences in these elasticities.22
organization, import penetration is positively related to tariffs, and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level.  However, only the Influence Driven and not the contribution
variable from the Tariff Function model is significant at the 1 percent level.  The lack of
significance of the estimate of the contribution variable suggests that organization is
indeed more important than outright contributions.
6.2  Non-Nested Hypothesis Testing
In keeping with the objective of the paper, we return to the models that were
suggested by the theory.  Section 6.1 provides heuristic evidence that organization is
more significant than contribution variables.  In this section we seek to further evaluate
the relative strength of each exact theoretical model in explaining endogenous protection,
by performing a series of non-nested tests.  Our methodology is to test the relative
strength of each model against each of the two competing alternatives.  We follow the
test procedure for non-nested J tests developed by Davidson and  MacKinnon (1981,
1993).
16 An insignificant coefficient estimate in Table 3 implies that the null hypothesis
can be rejected, implying that the alternative does not add significant estimation power to
the null hypothesis.
17
Table 3 reports the J test statistics, and the results of the first four rows provide
surprisingly powerful evidence in favor of the Influence Driven model and against the
other two models.  In rows one and two, the J test rejects the null hypothesis that either
the Political Support Model (with PROFITS1) or the Tariff Function model is the true
model.  In both cases the addition of the Influence Driven model's variables - specifically
the information whether a sector is organized or not - turns out to add significant
information in estimating endogenous protection.  In rows two and three, the J test reports
that neither the Tariff Function model, nor the Political Support model add information to
the Influence Driven model in estimating endogenous protection.  The null hypothesis of
                                                                
16 The intuition of the J tests is the following.  Suppose the truth (the null hypothesis) we wish to test is
( ) i i i i a f y H 0 0 , e l + = =  where a is a vector of parameters to be estimated and  i l is a vector of observations
on exogenous variables.  Suppose theory suggests an alternative hypothesis  ( ) i i i i a g y H 1 1 ' , ' ' e l + = =  where
a'  and  ' i l  are different vectors of parameters and observations.  The J test tests for  k  = 0 in
( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i a g a f y e l k l k + - + = ' ˆ , ' 1 ,  where  ' ˆ a  is the ML estimate of  ' a .  See Davidson and MacKinnon
(1981) for details.23
the Influence Driven model being the "true" model cannot be rejected.  All test statistics
are at an astonishing 1 percent significance level.
The search for second best alternatives among the Tariff Function and the
Political Support model yield ambiguous results.  In row five, Political Support adds no
information to the Tariff Function model at the 1 percent significance level.  On the other
hand, the Tariff Function model adds weak additional information to the Political Support
model, as indicated in row six.  The low J statistic in row 6 suggests the Tariff Function
model came close to adding sufficient information to reject the hypothesis that Political
Support is indeed the true model.
The interpretations of the J test results are in line with the results in Table 1 and
Table 2, but add important further information.  The Influence Driven model had the best
fit in Table 1 and survived as the only significant estimate in Table 2.  Hence it is not
surprising that it "beat" both models soundly in the J test.  Surprising is how resoundingly
the Influence Driven model beats the Tariff Function model in the J test, given that both
models generated similar results in Table 1.  The weakness of the Tariff Function is also
unexpected as it fails to reject the Political Support Model, which has not performed
throughout.
7 Summary and Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is the exact empirical investigation of three
prominent endogenous protection models.  In the absence of reduced forms and
extraneous variables to the regression we find that the simple testable implications of the
models yield powerful results.  All estimated coefficients in the Political Support
Function, the Tariff Function, and Influence Driven models have the expected sign.  For
the Tariff Function and the Influence Driven models, the implied values of the parameters
of the underlying theoretical models are plausible and highly statistically significant.  Our
results of the Influence Driven model are comparable to the values reported in previous
studies, however, our different estimation method allows us to confirm all of the models
predictions, in contrast to previous work.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
17 For this class of tests, the non-nested alternative hypothesis need not be true.  Nor does a rejected null
hypothesis imply that the alternative is accepted.24
The Influence Driven model exhibits the best overall fit among the individual
models. Further evidence for the superiority of the Influence Driven model comes from
non-nested misspecification tests which indicate that the Influence Driven model, when
tested against each of the other models, cannot be rejected.  Overall the Political Support
Function approach disappoints. This may be because of shortcomings in the data. Profit
data are notoriously noisy, and even using two alternative measures does not help the
results. The results give rise to the strong impression that the Political Support Function
approach suffers from its exclusion of the explicit modeling of the incentives of agents to
lobby or contribute, as it focuses exclusively on the political interests.
There is ample work remaining for future research.  Most questionable perhaps
might be the assumption, which we share with the previous literature, that a single
country facing constant world prices is examined.  At this point data constraints limit us
to apply our approach to the potentially more realistic case of a large open economy.
Secondly, we do not include two other prominent political economy models into our
analysis.  The Electoral Competition approach pioneered by Magee, Brock and Young
(1989) could not be included because the formal modeling has not yielded a testable tariff
formation function that is similar to the ones above, or that allows us to take the strict
theory to the data.  However, Grossman and Helpman (1996) have derived several sharp
implications that can be taken to the data, using reduced forms.  The other alternative
endogenous protection model not included here is the prominent median voter model
(Mayer 1984). Again the lack of information on the median voter rendered the empirical
implementation impossible.25
Appendix: Description of Variables
TOTALSALESi, value of shipments per industry, 1996 NBER productivity database.
TOTALSALES, is the aggregation over all industries' value of shipments.
Import demand elasticities,  i e , are taken from Sheills, Stern, and Deardorff (1986).
Following G-M, the small number of industries with positive import demand
elasticities are set to zero.
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs),  i t , (Trefler 1993), aggregated to the three-digit level using
as weights the value of shipments.
Import penetration ratio, z, (Trefler 1993), aggregated to the three-digit level using as
weights the value of shipments
Instrumental variables,  (Trefler 1993), aggregated to the three-digit level using as
weights the value of shipments. The list of instrumental variables is identical to
the one used by G-M: Physical capital, inventories, engineers and scientists,
white-collar, skill, semiskilled, cropland, pasture, forest, coal, petroleum,
minerals, seller concentration, buyer concentration, seller number of firms, buyer
number of firms, scale, capital stock, unionization, geographic concentration,
tenure.
Political Action Committee contributions, total firm and union contributions by
industry obtained for the 1983-84 congressional elections (Gawande, 1998); firm
and union spending is multiplied by the number of firms and unions to obtain
totals.
TOTALCONTRIBUTIONSi, the sum of firm and union contributions per industry.
ORGANIZED, firm contribution dummy, set to zero if industry-level contribution is
smaller than 10 million and 1 if it is larger.
18
PROFITS1, value-added minus total labor cost, 1996 NBER productivity database.
PROFITS2, 1983 pre-tax income from IRS source book, converted from SOI
classification to three-digit SIC level.
                                                                
18 We use GM’s 10 million threshold.  They do, however, report their threshold as 100 million, which is a
typo (there is not one sector that contributed 100 million)26
Table 1:
Strictly Theory Based Tests of Endogenous protection Models
IV Tobit estimations
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***/**/*: 1 percent/ 5 percent/ 10 percent significance level, t-statistics in parentheses27
Table 2:
"General" Endogenous protection Models
IV Tobit estimations







General 1a General 1b General 2
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Log-Likelihood -53.90 -50.58 -50.58








Political Support 1 Influence Driven .148 Reject null hypothesis
Tariff Function Influence Driven .999 Reject null hypothesis
Influence Driven Political Support 1 7.89*** Cannot reject null hypothesis
Influence Driven Tariff Function 2.79*** Cannot reject null hypothesis
Tariff Function Political Support 1 7.22*** Cannot reject null hypothesis
Political Support 1 Tariff Function 1.756* Cannot reject null hypothesis
***/**/*: 1 percent/ 5 percent/ 10 percent significance level, t-statistics in parentheses
Not being able to reject the null hypothesis implies that the model associated with the null hypothesis is the
"correct model" in the sense that information added by the alternative hypothesis does not improve the
estimation of the dependent variable.29
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